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Indonesia and the Philippines to compare the different labor politics and
worker movements in the two Southeast Asian nations experiencing un-
precedented growth and social change. But the financial crisis that broad-
sided the economies of the region also scuttled my initial comparative
project.
Nevertheless, circumstances presented old and new questions about de-
velopment, stability, and the role of foreign capital in an area that seemed to
go from "boom" to "basket case" overnight. How does a more global, in-
terconnected economy affect a locality's ability to transform itself? What
roles do international investment and the nation state play in promoting or
thwarting that transformation? And ultimately, what meanings and political
possibilities does the "new global economy" open for those drawn into its
web and who-by the sweat of their brows-bring it forth? Zeroing in on
the Philippines and high-tech electronics refocused my attention on new state
development strategies and the changing character of global production in
which local workers find themselves deeply enmeshed.
The journey from asking such questions to the attempts to answer them
in this book has been a long but enlightening one, aided by countless people
and groups across two hemispheres. My first and greatest debt of gratitude
.goes to my mentor, advisor, cajoler, and friend, Gay Seidman, of the De-
partment of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, who pro-
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I A New Politics of Production
AT 6:00 A.M., seventy-five bright blue buses, packed with dozing young
women, careen along scattered Philippine roadways and begin to converge.
The rumbling buses throw dust clouds over rural roads and turn the heads
of farmers already knee-deep in their fields. They funnel into the backstreets
of a peri-urban boomtown clogged with belching jeepneys, squatters' shacks,
and barbequed-banana stands. The acrid fumes of raw sewage and vulcan-
ized tire repair choke the air. Out of the chaos and inevitable traffic jam, the
buses turn into a restricted private road, past the reclining officers at the Pro-
vincial Industrial Police station, to finally reunite at the gates of the Philip-
pine Technology Park. 1
.
The guards wave the familiar buses into the empty streets of the export
zone, an industrial park dotted with low-slung buildings sporting the logos
of some of the world's best-known electronics companies. Arriving from
strategic pickup points as far as two hours away, the buses shuttle some four
thousand workers to the back door of Storage Limited, a manufacturer of
bleeding-edge hard disk drives. A crowd of prospective applicants pooled
around the guardhouse eyes the parade of buses enviously as it delivers the
first shift.
Once inside, the women make their way to the long rows of lockers to
wrestle into their hospital-blue "bunny suits." Talking and dressing in tan-
dem, they tuck and straighten each other's full-body uniforms, covering each
inch of skin until only their eyes are exposed. After swiping their ID badges
into the electronic time clock, they file through the long air shower corridors,
turning slowly with arms raised, before entering the virtually dust-free pro-
. duction area, a shop floor ten times more sterile than a hospital operating
room.
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2 Satanic Mills or Silicon Islands?
The vast production floor, with its long, neat lines of automated assembly
machines topped by red, yellow, and green warning lights, resembles an Or-
wellian casino. Yellow lines along the floor direct traffic. Through the pro-
duction area's glass walls, passing managers glance at the color-coded target
boards that hang above each section, announcing the productivity, quality,
and defect rates tallied by the computer monitoring system. Signs suspended
above the crowded testing area warn, "Absolute silence please." Video cam-
eras hover in nearly every corner so those in the control room can watch, or
not watch, what happens on the shop floor.
As they pour out of the air showers, workers take up the familiar positions
they left just twelve hours before. Because of the hard disk drives' extreme
sensitivity to static electricity, each worker wears a grounding cable attached
to her body that she "plugs in" to her workstation. Workers may not leave
their stations without permission, even to go to the bathroom. Thus, for most
of their twelve-hour shift, six and often seven days a week, they stand liter-
ally tethered to the line.
Even outside the production area, workers must adhere to the strictly en-
forced "good housekeeping" policies that stress orderliness, discipline, and
cleanliness in all areas of the plant. Roving inspectors, dubbed the "Quality
Control Patrol," are armed with Polaroid cameras and photograph workers
caught out of uniform or improperly dressed. They then display the pictures,
with blacked out faces, on a large bulletin board outside the canteen as a
warning to others.
Finally, an electronic bell chimes, the workers' muffled chatter dies away
and the computerized assembly line lurches to life.
The scene described above conjures up contradictory images of the prom-
ise and menace of the global economy. Spurred by the dizzying changes in
markets and technology, the trillion-dollar-a-year electronics sector has,
since the 1990S, deluged developing countries with a wave of manufactur-
ing investment. On the one hand, advanced electronics such as semiconduc-
tors and computer hard disk drives are widely coveted as leading industries
in the twenty-first century. For receiving countries, such investments provide
access to the latest technologies, bundled-it has been promised-with new
ways to organize work, better jobs, and a survival strategy in the cutthroat
world economy. On the other hand, the foregoing scenario seems to confirm
our worst fears about globalization's impact on workers: that increased for-
eign investment only leads to higher levels of exploitation in low-cost pro-
duction areas-the new "dark satanic mills"-where workers and nations
are more vulnerable to the whims of unmoored capital.
In reality, neither of these polarized views captures the dynamic character
of high-tech work. When I arrived in the Philippines to begin my fieldwork,
I found the landscape of high-tech production vastly more complex. First,
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1 the control room can watch, or
the multinational companies that have flooded into the Philippines are not
simply assembling last year's boom boxes or robot pets. Rather, these firms
churn out state-of-the-art products like the microprocessors in our wafer-
thin laptops or the digital signal chips for our shrinking cell phones. This
move to more sophisticated products has dramatically changed the organi-
zation of work, but not in uniform ways. Confounding the expectations of
both critics and proponents of transnational production, I found-even
within one industry in a single country-a wide array of curious organiza-
tional hybrids among firms, where production is 'flexible, innovative, and of
high quality, yet can still remain quite "sweated."
Where production takes place has also changed. Although investments
continue to pour almost exclusively into export processing zones, or EPZs,
the zones themselves have been transformed. In the past, export processing
zones, from Shenzhen to Central America, have been depicted by the media
and academics as simply deregulated and deterritorialized spaces of cheap
labor. But a new breed of zone has taken root in the Philippines, one owned
by private developers who have strategically relocated and reorganized the
zones, and downplayed the issue of wages. In fact, despite the relatively high
cost of Filipino labor, the country now boasts one of the top five export pro-
cessing zone programs in the world. In large part because of their revamped
zones, the Philippines has become one of the few places in the world outside
of China where leading electronics multinationals from the United States,
Europe, and Asia have all set up manufacturing operations.
Finally, the workers themselves defied my expectations. At first glance,
they seem to mirror the paradigmatic "nimble fingered" export processing
zone worker found around the world: young women working exhausting
schedules in tightly disciplined workplaces. But it seemed that reorganized
production has strengthened the workers' hand: these workers are all per-
manent-rather than temporary-employees in heavily invested, high-pro-
file multinationals that are acutely vulnerable to production disruptions. The
Philippines also has a long history of militant labor unionism that led the
fight for the world's first successful organizing of an entire export process-
ing zone. Yet, in spite of often harsh working conditions and what looks to
be an improved bargaining position, workers have shown little collective re-
sistance. Indeed, many workers described their work to me as "clean,"
"easy," and even "fun," and seemed genuinely committed to their jobs and
companies. Despite several concerted labor organizing campaigns, only
about I percent 6f the labor force works under a union contract.
So how do we make sense of high-tech production as it emerges in de-
veloping countries like the Philippines? What explains the changes and
wide variations in how work is organized? What can these changes tell us
about the transformation of work in a globalizing economy? And finally,
what consequences do these changes have for workers, the vast majority
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of whom are women? This book engages these key research questions by
taking them up at a strategically crucial and empirically grounded flash-
point: a local site of global production and the local labor market in which
it is embedded.
Specifically, through detailed case studies, I explore how four multinational
electronics firms-American, Japanese, European, and Korean, respectively
-located in four different Philippine export processing zones choose to
organize work, control labor, and secure worker commitment by reaching
beyond their factories and into workers' lives and communities. I also trace
the rise of privatized export processing zones, highlighting the Philippine
state's shifting but still significant role in labor control and the wider poli-
tics of global production. Finally, this book gives voice to the workers them-
selves, emphasizing the meanings they attach to high-tech work and their
strategies to negotiate factory discipline on and beyond the "new" shop
floor.
A common blind spot for both sides in globalization debates is a vision of
globalization that is as frictionless as it is placeless; a vision in which devel-
oping countries appear as either simple sites of despotism or as substitutable
templates for capital's unfolding production strategies. While globalization
critics argue that low-cost production locations are becoming increasingly
homogenized as they compete against one another to attract investment, pro-
ponents see high-tech production delivering the fruits of higher technology
and better jobs anywhere. But at the core of both arguments is an overly
generic characterization of production itself, whether exploitative or em-
powering, which makes the substitutability of locations possible. Over-
looked is the elementary notion that, despite its transnational and high-tech
nature, advanced production must still be constituted someplace, by a spe-
cific group of workers in gritty locales like the one sketched above in the
Philippines.
This book challenges the myths that high-tech production is generic and
that globalization is simply a homogenizing force. First, I argue that techno-
logical change, new competitive demands, and contradictions within produc-
tion are pushing high-tech firms to use a wide range of diverse organizational
strategies, which I label flexible accumulation. Second, I argue that the re-
structuring of work has broadened the scope of labor control, extending it
outside the factory and making the specificities and uniqueness of place more,
not less, important. Third, I argue that firms, aided by host country govern-
ments, directly intervene in the local labor market in order to constitute and
reproduce the social and gendered relations of flexible accumulation.
My arguments focus on two related processes integral to high-tech man-
ufacturing in the Philippines. The first process is what I call the strategic lo-
calization of production. Here, I expand on a term used by economic
geographer Andrew Mair (1997), referring to how firms develop site-specific
labor control and work organizat
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ach to high-tech work and their
)n and beyond the "new" shop
labor control and work organization strategies depending on local patterns
of labor regulation. The second process-a recasting of Michael Burawoy's
(1979) notion of worker consent-is the active creation of worker commit-
ment. Central to both of these processes and linking them together is the po-
litical construction of the local labor market. Each of these processes will be
discussed in more detail below.
Most fundamentally, this book tells the story of how four different elec-
tronics manufacturing firms, facing contradictory demands in high-tech pro-
duction and a crucial need for stability, craft a variety of new and more
complex systems of production control. These variable systems include mas-
tering new production technologies, securing worker commitment, and tap-
ping into both formal and informal institutions of state regulation. The
proper combinations of these elements are often realized through firms' lo-
calization strategies that exploit the uniqueness of place, the dynamics of
space, and social cleavages in the labor force-based on gender, age, class,
and residence-in order to leverage workers' labor market vulnerabilities
and elicit worker commitment and consent. My objective is to look below
macrolevel state interventions, beyond factory strategies, and more deeply
into labor market manipulation to develop a broader, place-sensitive theory
of high-tech production politics. This new model, which I call the "political
apparatus of flexible accumulation," highlights the various roles that firms,
state, and nonstate actors play in the reorganization of production and the
reproduction of workers themselves.
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In tackling the questions of how production is being restructured and how
it affects workers and their lives, it is important to begin with a fundamen-
tal point: that work and markets are socially organized, and that the social
relations in production depend heavily on the nature of managerial author-
ity and the structures of organizational control. We start here because, while
it has been the bedrock of much scholarship on work from Karl Marx to the
labor process tradition to contemporary studies of organizations, the rise of
restructured workplaces has prompted claims that "traditional" authority
relations under mass production-often based on bureaucratically thick hi-
erarchies-are being radically transformed in favor of devolved decision-
making and increased worker autonomy and control over work.
Indeed, out of the ashes of what some see as a "failure" of centralized forms
'of mass production to respond to the new changes have emerged several mod-
els of restructured production that are viewed as not only more competitive,
but also empowering for frontline workers, whose tacit knowledge and par-
ticipation are seen as crucial. Framers of the first model, dubbed flexible spe-
.'If,
~'*,,
6 Satanic Mills or Silicon Islands?
cialization, argue that small, highly flexible, and networked firms using a
strategy of permanent innovation, multiuse equipment, and a bevy of skilled
production workers respond most ably to changing markets and technology
(Piore and Sabel 1984). As an antidote to alienated labor under mass produc-
tion, flexible specialization "is predicated on collaboration. . . . the produc'-
tion worker's intellectual participation in the work process is enhanced-and
his or her role revitalized" (Piore and Sabel 1984, 278). A second and now
more prevalent model is known as "lean production," which emerged from
studies of the Japanese manufacturing industries and their emphasis on
quality. The crucial elements here are new forms of efficiency-statistical
process control, just-in-time production, low inventories, and "efficient"
staffing-anchored, again, by the participation of multiskilled, securely
tenured workers organized into teams (Kenney and Florida 1993; Mac-
Duffie 1995; Womack et al. 1990). Finally, proponents of what are known
as "high-performance work organizations" draw on the core technical and
organizational elements of both previous models, but with a greater em-
phasis on the complementary human resource practices such as individual-
ized incentive schemes and employment relations policies to inspire worker
commitment and participation (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Belanger et al.
2002; MacDuffie 1995; Osterman 1994; Pfeffer 1994). Like their prede-
cessors, these authors argue that firms adopting their model can become
globally competitive precisely because they dismantle hierarchical relations
in production and draw on workers' knowledge and decision-making au-
tonomy to drive innovation and flexibility.
What the three strands of the optimistic flexibility literature have in com-
mon is a belief that mass production has failed as a viable mode of industrial
organization. Ardent proponents claim that flexible or lean production is the
new" one best way" to remain competitive under the new global capitalism.
But while most manufacturers acknowledge that there have been changes in
the demands of global competition, precious few are "taking the cure" of flex-
ible production (Babson 1995; Osterman 2000). In the United States, despite
dramatic results in several model cases such as the Saturn and NUMMI auto
assembly plants, and the wide adoption of some practices across firms, the
pace of innovation and organization change has been generally slow (Appel-
baum and Batt 1994; Kalleberg 2003; Vallas 2003). According to Osterman's
(2000) longitudinal survey of American firms, only about 15 percent of large
firms have adopted fully reorganized workplaces and production processes.
So in the face of the ostensibly superior performance and competitiveness
of restructured work organization, why ha ve so few firms adopted these new
models? The fundamental answer is that there are multiple paths to flexibil-
ity and ways to respond to changing economic conditions that do not nec-
essarily call for the radical reorganization of production. This then leads to
further questions: what has changed, and how are competitive firms re-
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tant to begin with a reassessment of the core modeJ from which so much of
the flexible and Jean production systems draw their inspiration; the "Japa-
nese" systen1.
In a brilliant, historical account of the reception and adaptation of Amer-
ican management ideas in Japan, WiJliam Tsutsui (1998) argues that the
success of contemporary Japanese industry is due in large part to the ways
in which F. W. Taylor's scientific management ideas have worked both as
an ideological framework and as a shop floor methodology. Tsutsui traces
how the ideas of progress through rationality and science were extended
from the shop floor to the industry and national political level to form the
core of Japan's postwar productivist vision for economic growth. This pro-
ductivist ideology served to enhance, and was itself undergirded by, the ap-
plication and adaptation of engineer-led Taylorist practices, such as the
appropriation of workers' craft knowledge and the application of statisti-
cal process control. Lean production at Toyota, he shows, relied particu-
larly heavily on the core Taylorist practices of time-and-motion studies and
layout design developed during the war and postwar period. Tsutsui (1998,
242- 4 3) concludes:
Gexibility literature have in com-
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flexible or lean production is the
under the new global capitalism.
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The pervasive influence of Taylorism and the frustrated career of Fordism sug-
gest that a label like "non-Fordist" -or, better yet, "revised Taylorite" -best
captures the nature of contemporary Japanese production arrangements. . . . In
Japan as in the West, managerial commitment to the humanization of work has
remained shallow and, for the most part, rhetorical rather than practical: even
Japanese innovations like quality control circles, so widely praised as models of
democratic and compassionate management, were born of the perennial man-
agerial drive to Taylorize the shop floor.
When we demystify "Japanese-style management" and expose its essen-
tially Taylorist roots, it becomes obvious that combining flexibility with hi-
erarchical employee relations remains a viable and competitive strategy in
advanced manufacturing. For example, in large apparel firms in both the
United States and abroad, managers deploy expensive new flexible tech-
nologies to respond to the vicissitudes of a changing market, yet maintain
the same, fundamentally labor-intensive production processes and leave un-
changed hierarchical relations on the shop floor (Collins 2003; Taplin 1995).
Similarly in the North American auto industry, lean production has not
proven to be a blueprint, but rather more like a menu of technical and so-
cial practices (Babson 1999). Firms may choose from the menu depending
on the specific technical requirements of the product, but more important,
depending on "the particular history of the.plant- or firm-level collective bar-
gaining, past practices, demographics, and other factors [that] constrain or
facilitate implementation" (Babson 1999, 26).
~
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Labor Control and the Politics of Production
Burawoy (I985) breathed both
trol debates by theorizing a dynal
broader state politics. Based on hi~
or the technical organization of pI
of production-or the institutions
gles-he posits two basic types of,
which work is organized around sl
which workers "must be persuade
exploitation (Burawoy I985, 126
tributing factors to regime differene
labor power reproduction, and st
that critically distinguishes despoti
when states provide welfare benef
gain enough bargaining leverage t
leading to a consent-based hegem.
monic regimes in advanced countri
competition from developing cour
gimes still reign.
While providing a strong analyt,
Burawoy's unmodified theory is a1
organization and the blurring of c<
tronics manufacturing, particular
many globalization critics, argue
export processing zones simply ex
cion at the point of production" (B
tism still exists-as we will see in
'
larger, now dominant sectors of a
so neatly characterized.
Recent technological and mark<
tensity and a more complex cor
commodities such as hard disk dri
conductor chips now compete sin
product differentiation, and spee<
orchestrate intricate production I
and regionally agglomerated (Me
cess, these market imperatives cre
turers must juggle the standardizj
production and economies of scal,
short product cycles, rapid techni
tomers. These contradictory dema
a variety of production organizat
what might best be called competi
son 1999). And as many studies 1
coercion and simple control of tel
This critical approach is particularly relevant for lean production as it is
applied in developing countries. Shaiken and others have shown convinc-
ingly that competitive, high-tech production can be successfully sited in a
low-wage, low-skill context and in ways that do not fundamentally disturb
traditional power relations on the shop floor (Shaiken and Browne I99I;
Deyo 1997). Luthje (2°°4) describes state-of-the-art semiconductor plants
in China that are flexible and produce high quality products, but in which
work remains resolutely standardized and workers directly controlled by su-
pervisors. In fact, it was found that managerial flexibility, more than low
wages, proved. more important to production efficiency, particularly in
highly automated plants. This flexibility was gained primarily because man-
agement had a freer hand, unencumbered by union opposition (Shaiken
1995; see also Herzenberg 1996; Carrillo 1995).
Thus it becomes increasingly apparent that recent market changes are in-
tensifying competition and pushing firms to adopt strategies, generally de-
signed along neo-Taylorist lines, to produce more (and better) with less.
However, this important but still quite general insight does not bring us
closer to understanding why, in the Philippine case, there remains so much
organizational variation between the high-tech firms in a single industry.
Why do workers in these firms continue to be committed to such neo-Tay-
lorist jobs? And what do the recent changes in production have to do with
changes in how the export processing zones are organized? What is needed
is a stronger theoretical framework for understanding both continuity and
change under globalization, and the variation in the meanings and organi-
zation of work in advanced manufacturing.
In this book I propose we revisit the issues of labor control and the social re-
lations in production that were at the core of labor process theory, but in
light of recent trends, recast and transcend the analytical framework of one
of its most advanced theorists, Michael Burawoy. Specifically, I develop a
more comprehensive model of labor control, focusing on three key areas
where the "new" politics of high-tech production play out, namely: at the
point of production, where workers and mangers struggle over contradic-
tory logics in the labor process; in the local labor market, where firms en-
gage in localization strategies to enhance their bargaining position vis-a-vis
labor; and finally, through national and local state institutions that regulate
and help reproduce the social relations in and of production. Through this
integrated approach, I hope to better explain the wide range of organiza-
tional strategies I found among the four case studies, the impetus for the re-
organization of the export processing zones, and the reasons for the low
levels of collective resistance among the high-tech manufacturing work force.
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Burawoy (1985) breathed both controversy and new life into labor con-
trol debates by theorizing a dynamic link between shop floor politics and
broader state politics. Based on his distinction between the labor process-
or the technical organization of production-and the political apparatuses
of production-or the institutions that regulate and shape workplace strug-
gles-he posits two basic types of capitalist factory regimes: the despotic, in
which work is organized around shop floor coercion; and the hegemonic, in
which workers "must be persuaded to cooperate" or consent to their own
exploitation (Burawoy 1985,126). Although Burawoy identifies four con-
tributing factors to regime difference-the labor process, market competition,
labor power reproduction, and state intervention-it is state intervention
that critically distinguishes despotic from hegemonic regimes. He argues that
when states provide welfare benefits and enforce labor legislation, workers
gain enough bargaining leverage to extract concessions from management,
leading to a consent-based hegemonic regime. But he also warns that hege-
monic regimes in advanced countries are undermined by capital mobility and
competition from developing countries, where low-wage, despotic work re-
gimes still reign.
While providing a strong analytical framework to approach restructuring,
Burawoy's unmodified theory is at pains to explain the complexity of work
organization and the blurring of coercion and consent in contemporary elec-
tronics manufacturing, particularly in developing countries. Burawoy, like
many globalization critics, argues that production in developing country
export processing zones simply exploits cheap labor, "requiring brutal coer-
cion at the point of production" (Burawoy 1985, 265). Although such despo-
tism still exists-as we will see in one of the case studies-production in the
larger, now dominant sectors of advanced electronics manufacturing is not
so neatly characterized.
Recent technological and market changes have meant increased capital in-
tensity and a more complex competitiveness. Firms producing high-tech
commodities such as hard disk drives, microprocessors, and integrated semi-
conductor chips now compete simultaneously on the bases of cost, quality,
product differentiation, and speed-to-market (Ernst 20°3). They must also
orchestrate intricate production networks that are both globally dispersed
and regionally agglomerated (McKendrick et al. 2000). For the labor pro-
cess, these market imperatives create a number of contradictions. Manufac-
turers must juggle the standardizing pressures of high-quality, high-volume
production and economies of scale with the flexibility pressures of extremely
short product cycles, rapid technical innovation, and responsiveness to cus-
tomers. These contradictory demands often mean that firms experiment with
a variety of production organization and labor control strategies to achieve
what might best be called competitive flexible production (Vallas 2°°3; Bab-
son 1999). And as many studies have shown, work regimes based solely on
coercion and simple control often lead to instability, inflexibility, and poor
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quality-precisely those areas in which advanced producers must compete
(Edwards 1979; Burawoy I985).
Given the need for production quality and stability, management often
prefers worker consent over coercion, even in the absence of state interven-
tion to enforce labor laws or provide welfare provisions. This is increasingly
true for final assembly processes, since on-time delivery and relations with
customers are crucial and a consent-based system is less disruptive. As will
be shown in the case studies and discussed in detail below, management tries
to organize worker commitment in order to reduce costly turnover and head
off any stoppages or slowdowns in production. Firms must also contend with
existing and potential collective worker resistance, employing different
strategies depending on, as Babson (I999) noted above, the history of col-
lective bargaining, past practices, worker demographics, and other factors
that might restrain the free hand of management.
These new and more active strategies to stabilize production exploit a
broader basis for constructing worker consent than Burawoy and others the-
orize. In his analysis, Burawoy remains firmly focused on the shop floor.
Other theorists, such as Ching Kwan Lee (I998) in her comparative study of
workers in Hong Kong and Guangdong, China, extend his insights, arguing
that worker consent is crucial but that nonclass subjectivities formed outside
the workplace-based on gender, culture, and conditions in the labor mar-
ket-are equally important factors shaping worker interests. However, Lee,
like Burawoy, fails to recognize alternative types of state intervention beyond
the bureaucratic model that nevertheless have a direct role in reproducing la-
bor power and constructing worker consent. Burawoy implies that the state
acts primarily on the macroeconomic level: providing general welfare bene-
fits and regulating industrial relations.2 Lee cites only the state's conspicu-
ous absence in intervening at the firm level. Yet increasingly, because of the
complexities of global production and competition, states must often go be-
yond traditional bureaucratic regulation at the national level in order to
draw and retain investment (O'Riain 2004).
Finally, in Lee's extended model of consent, it is workers' labor market de-
pendence that "determines management strategies of incorporating labor"
(Lee I998, 12). However, her account treats conditions in the labor market as
entirely exogenous. As noted above, she does not acknowledge the active role
of the state, a central player in the political construction of the labor market.
She also underestimates the power of employers, who do not simply respond
to labor market conditions but can actively shape labor markets in order to
increase worker dependence, enhance commitment, and diffuse resistance.
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Changes in advanced manufacturing are leading to a greater need for pro-
duction stability and worker consent. But both firms and the state have de-
veloped new strategies and intervene in a variety of arenas, constructing
more complex political apparatuses of production than Burawoy considers.
In particular, the active roles of both employers and the state in the manip-
ulation of the labor market require a rethinking and expanded understand-
ing of labor control and worker consent that goes beyond the shop floor.
Beginning in production, I draw on the theories of "flexible accumulation"
as a better way to characterize and understand recent changes in work or-
ganization in the face of technological change, intensified global competi-
tion, and rising uncertainty since the I970S (Harvey 1989; Rubin 1995;
Gottfried 2000). At the macro level, flexible accumulation represents a
regime shift in the dominant mode of economic growth, distribution, and
regulation, from mass production, mass consumption, and a liberal welfare
state under "Fordism" toward more customized production, fragmented
markets, and increasingly neoliberal governance under "flexible accumula-
tion" (Piore and Sabel 1984; Harvey 2001).3 At the level of production, flex-
ible accumulation represents a shift in the labor process and labor relations.
As Vallas (1999,91) explains in his critical review of workplace restructur-
ing, "As firms added new and more flexible ways to accumulating capital-
or put differently, removed inherited barriers to profitability-they have at
the same time refashioned the structures of work, labor markets, and the em-
ployment relation itself." In direct contrast to theories of lean production or
high-performance work organizations that see such changes in technology
and organization as having positive or at least neutral impact on production
workers, flexible accumulation theory views these refashioned structures as
far less benign.
First, Vallas (1999; 20°3) and others note that restructuring often inten-
sifies, rather than diminishes the separation between "professional" and
"production" workers. In the case studies to follow, this is most apparent in
the growing divide between production operators and technical or engi-
neering staff. Crucially, this process of technological change on the shop floor
is also highly gendered, intensifying an already gender-segmented job struc-
ture and limiting the potential for mobility and upskilling for women pro-
duction workers. Second, flexible accumulation has led to the rise of
decentralized but hierarchical production networks and new power rela-
tions, such as the rise in customer power and the dominance of the parent
ists who recognize that states under glob-
level policies (Hollingsworth and Boyer
3. Gottfried (2000) makes the same distinction between modes of economic growth, but la-
bels the "new" regime following Fordism as "Neo-Fordism" to highlight the continuity of
Fordist, or standardized, hierarchical ways to organize work, rather than a fundamental break.
w
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firm through research and design. In this book, the firms are all branch plants
of much larger electronics multinationals involved primarily in assembly and
test manufacturing. At this end in the production chain, their principal con-
cern is not generating innovation through genuine worker participation, but
primarily positive customer interaction and production stability through
workplace control. These issues of the limits of workplace participation for
worker empowerment and the widening (and gendered) gap between pro-
duction and technical workers will be discussed more fully in chapter 3. Fi-
nally, flexible accumulation recognizes that firms not only consider, but can
also affect the social and cultural environments in which they exist. While
Vallas (1999) focuses on how firms influence tastes and market demand
rather than treat them as exogenous, I focus in this research on how firms
not only actively engage with their localities but can shape inequalities within
them as well.
To better understand how work is organized in the four case studies, I de-
velop a more integrated notion of labor control drawing from Burawoy's
own emphasis on the reproduction of the social relations in and of produc-
tion. Here I draw on the work of critical economic geographers for their in-
sights into how differences or segmentation both within and between labor
markets and locales interact with investment decisions and the organization
of production itself. In terms of labor control, I take a more expansive, place-
sensitive view following Peck's (1996, 179) broader definition: "labor con-
trol refers to the reproduction of the social relations of both the labor process
and the labor market. This conception of labor control embraces the inter-
related processes of (I) securing an appropriate labor supply, (2) maintain-
ing control within the labor process and (3) reproducing this set of social
relations.
"
My approach, then, is a reconstruction of Burawoy's political apparatuses
of production modified for new forms of flexible accumulation, giving equal
weight to the three interrelated processes of labor control. Specifically, I look
below the macrolevel interventions of the national welfare state and the in-
terests of "capital-in-general," evoking Jonas's (1996) concept of a localla-
bor control regime. As Jonas (1996, 335) explains:
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Whereas capital-in-general is interested in the free and unlimited exchange of
labor power, particular capitals are sensitive to the local contexts in which that
exchange takes place. As such, they develop labor control strategies which limit
the "freedom" of labor and regulate the conditions under which it enters the la-
bor process.
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Using the lens of local labor control, I examine two key processes of re-
producing labor power and the work regimes taking place in the Philippines:
the strategic localization of production and the active construction of worker
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One of the central goals of this book is to demonstrate not only that locali-
ties continue to matter under globalization, but how. To this end, I develop
an expanded notion of strategic localization to better understand the role of
place in securing control over production and the consent of workers. Strate-
gic localization can also help illuminate how both firms and local govern-
ments are intimately involved in constructing a multilayered, place-based
political apparatus to regulate high-tech production. Despite the outcry from
globalization critics, the dispersal of increasingly sC?phisticated production
across space has not created a kind of placeless globalism in which all capi-
tal is necessarily footloose and production locations equally substitutable
(Frobel et al. 1978; Burawoy 1985; Greider 1997). Rather, the new, more
complex competitiveness has lead firms to seek distinct local "fixities" such
as pockets of uniquely skilled labor and particular regulatory regimes to
maximize their cost, quality, and speed-to-market advantages (O'Riain
2004; Brenner 2004). The specific nature of the firm, its production process,
and its labor needs will influence what types of workers, and thus what type
of locality, it seeks (Massey 1995). As we will see, the four multinational elec-
tronics firms in this book all came to the Philippines in the mid 1990S for a
complex set of reasons that include the availability of highly educated and
English-speaking production and technical workers, proximity to corporate
headquarters and/or key markets, existing clusters of other high-tech pro-
ducers, and a variety of government incentives aimed specifically at high-tech
man ufacturers.
National and local states, then, play crucial roles in strategic localization
by attempting to lure such global investment. State actors matter not only
because they preside over basic regulatory policies, such as setting wages, en-
forcing employment contracts, providing social welfare benefits, and craft-
ing wider economic policies (Berger and Dore 1996; Hollingsworth and
Boyer 1997). Increasingly, state actors at multiple levels respond directly to
particular industrial investors by pursuing more targeted strategies such as
upgrading complementary infrastructure and selectively regulating both in-
dustry and labor to provide the appropriate conditions for more advanced
production (O'Riain 2004). To meet the changing needs of the electron-
ics industry, the Philippine state has quite actively transformed its export
processing zone program from an emphasis on deregulated public zones to
attract simple manufacturing assemblers in the 1970S to a model of reregu-
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lated, privatized high-tech enclaves that appeal to the leading multinational
manufacturers of the twenty-first century. The transformation of the zone
program and its accommodation to the needs of the global electronics in-
dustry will be more fully explored in chapter 4.
Under strategic localization, multinational firms also actively adjust their
policies and work regimes to fit local conditions. For example, Japanese con-
sumer electronics producers that have set up production in California use
very few "Japanese" production practices such as quality circles or JIT
(Milkman 1991). Instead, these firms chose to adapt most of their policies
to local conditions, norms, and practices. As Andrew Mair (1997,80), study-
ing the Honda Motor Corporation in the United States and Europe, notes:
"The objective of local human resource managers was precisely to design
structures able to build a coherent bridge linking Honda's fixed labor process
requirements, such as very low absenteeism, good discipline, assignment
flexibility, and willingness to suggest improvements, with the local cultural
and social environment" (emphasis in original).
But what Mair refers to as "the local cultural and social environment" is
in fact primarily patterns of local labor regulation and conditions and wages
in local labor markets. And, as we will see in the four case studies, employ-
ers not only try to adapt to local conditions, but in fact also attempt to di-
rectly and indirectly influence conditions in the labor market to enhance their
competitive advantage and control over labor and the work process. At the
national level, for example, firms may seek exemptions from national labor
laws in order to align location conditions to their work regimes-rather than
the other way around. The weak bargaining position of developing country
governments and their desperate need to attract investments often mean they
must grant such concessions and refrain from imposing too many restric-
tions. But not all local conditions can be negotiated at the national level, and
all firms must engage with their locality, particularly in terms of building and
reproducing their workforce.
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The clearest demonstration of how location continues to matter even after
the initial investment is in the workings and regulation of local labor mar-
kets. Rather than accept an economist's human capital view of the labor
market as a container for universal, smooth, and power-neutral market ex-
changes, I draw on more sociological theories of the labor market that rec-
ognize it as a power-laden and contingent process of negotiation between
firms, workers, and their networks in matching different kinds of people with
different types of jobs (Granovetter and Tilly 1988; Tilly and Tilly 1994).
Employers are interested primarily in two main aspects of matching jobs and
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Organizational maintenance, in the context of advanced electronics produc-
tion, is focused on the stability of production and the construction of worker
commitment. But as we will see through the case studies, there are multiple
ways to maximize both.
To understand how this can happen, I turn to labor market segmentation
theory, which recognizes that the differences among people and among jobs
are stratified-that is, the rules governing the matching process differ in each
segment and that mobility between segments is often difficult (Peck 1996).
Thus workers and job seekers are characterized and grouped in a wide vari-
ety of ways-by age, gender, race, civil status-giving them different levels
of labor market bargaining power even if they share ostensibly equal "hu-
man capital." While employers do not necessarily create unequal social di-
visions, this does not prevent them from exploiting, and thus reproducing
them. As Rubery and Wilkinson (1994, 31-32, emphasis added) note:
Segmented labor markets with comparable labor available at different terms
and conditions provide the opportunity to employers to tailor their labor mar-
ket strategies to their needs without necessarily sacrificing the benefits of an es-
tablished and committed workforce. . . . Thus employers have the best of
several worlds: the domestic circumstances of married women for example
provides the basis for a flexible, committed but cheap labor force: primar;
workers at secondary prices.
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main aspects of matching jobs and
In the four cases I present in this book, we will see how different firms,
with different production strategies, choose to manipulate the labor market
positions of diverse groups through their gendered recruitment practices,
union avoidance policies, and active disorganization and dispersal of worker
housing.
It must also be emphasized that other actors and conditions affect this ne-
gotiation between workers and employers. As Miriam Wells (1996) points
out, labor markets are not just socially but also politically constructed. In
her study of the California strawberry industry, she highlights how active
state policies, such as border control, immigration, and (lack of) labor pro-
tection shape labor markets and workers' labor market leverage even before
employment. In particular, she demonstrates that the surplus Jabor market
conditions can have the appearance of being unstructured and competitive.
But, in fact, political forces and state policies often affect aggregate labor
supply and constrain the options of labor market participants.
. Similar forces affecting labor market power seem to be at work in the
Philippines. Given the vital importance of political stability to multinational
firms and the Philippine state's own dependence on foreign investment, the
state plays a critical role in labor control and the politicization of the pro-
1t:
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duction context. As we shall see in chapter 4, the state actively reduces work-
ers' bargaining power, even before they step onto the shop floor, through the
reorganization and regulation of export processing zones (EPZs), enforce-
ment of "industrial peace," and in its selective nonenforcement of the Philip-
pine Labor Code, which guarantees the right to organize and bargain
collectively.
.i
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Securing Commitment in an Insecure World
The second key process that helps stabilize high-tech production and secure
labor control is the active construction of worker commitment. My focus on
securing commitment is akin to Burawoy's notion of "manufacturing con-
sent," or the need to persuade workers to cooperate. However, as many have
pointed out, Burawoy's understanding of consent and worker interests re-
mains undertheorized because it fails to unravel, from a worker's point of
view, all the myriad elements (gender, age, culture, and other experiences)
that contribute to workers' interests, identities, and subjectivities-those
that go beyond issues of class and beyond the shop floor (Lee 1998; Freeman
2000; Salzinger 2003). At the same time, traditional studies of commitment
from the psychology, organizations, and human resource literatures remain
woefully underpoliticized; these studies often neglect issues of power and
control, the effectiveness of negative sanctions, and the influence of wider
social inequalities. While proponents of "high performance" or "high com-
mitment" work organizations are correct that worker commitment is crucial
to advanced manufacturing, too often they assume a direct causal relation-
ship between positive incentives, worker commitment, participation, discre-
tionary effort, and improved firm performance (Appelbaum et a!. 2000;
MacDuffie 1995; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990). As I will show, worker com-
mitment is deeply intertwined with management strategies to maintain
power and control: the four firms in this book elicit worker commitment pri-
marily to ensure workplace stability, dampen worker disruption and
turnover, and increase overall control over production. And in securing this
commitment, slack and segmented labor markets again playa vital role, as
firms leverage workers' labor market vulnerabilities and dependence on their
jobs to induce greater willingness to accept conditions and terms at work.
At least since Hirschman's (1970) theory of exit, voice, and loyalty, re-
search on organizational commitment has focused on a firm's internal and
positive rewards system (see Meyer and Allen 1997 for a review). But while
firms in this book do use positive internal incentives, such as good pay and
benefits, they also use many negative and external strategies, such as strict
shop floor discipline and selective recruiting of women workers from im-
poverished rural areas. To understand the use of both positive and negative
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